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NOTES
THE APPLICABILITY OF MIRANDA TO THE
POLICE BOOKING PROCESS
After a criminal suspect has been arrested and taken to a police
station or other law enforcement office, he is usually' subjected to the
process known as "booking," during which a record is made of his
name, address, other identifying data, and the details of his arrest. The
information obtained during booking is intended primarily for adminis-
trative use,3 and the questions are rarely objectionable from the suspect's
point of view. In a small number of cases, however, the information
requested during booking has later been used at trial as evidence against
the suspect.4  The fact that booking occasionally does elicit incriminat-
1. After a suspect has been arrested, further questioning and investigation may
reveal that in fact no crime was committed, that there is insufficient evidence to
prosecute him, or that prosecution is undesirable for some other reason. In such cases
the individual may, in some jurisdictions, be released without being booked. Y.
KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 7 (4th ed. 1974).
2. The details of the booking process may vary from one jurisdiction to the next.
However, the procedures used in Durham, North Carolina, as described below,
are typical of the practices followed in most jurisdictions. See id. at 6-7; W. LAFAVE,
ARREST: THE DECIsIoN TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 379-82 (1965).
After a suspect has been arrested in Durham, identifying information is entered on a
standard form (the North Carolina Internal Records Arrest Report) for permanent
police files. The information required includes the suspect's complete name, alias or
nickname, complete address, place of birth, date of birth, age, sex, race, height, weight,
hair, eyes, complexion, marital status, social security number, occupation, and the name
and address of the suspect's employer or school. See Wainwright v. City of New
Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 605-06 (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of
certiorari); E. WILLIAMS, MODERN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND POLICE SCIENCE 57 (1967)
(sample arrest report form from an Illinois city). In certain statutorily defined cases,
the suspect may also be fingerprinted and photographed. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-502 (1975). See also MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 7. If the
suspect is to be jailed, all of his personal possessions will be taken, inventoried, and
stored. See N. POMRENKE, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: RULES AND REGULATIONS §
710.1 (1967) (pamphlet published by the Institute of Government, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill). See also F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, M. MELLI
& H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 367 (1969).
3. See notes 46-52 infra and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976) (statements about marital status and number of chil-
dren used as incriminating evidence); United States v. La Monica, 472 F.2d 580 (9th Cir.
1972) (use of defendant's explanation of receipt during routine inventory of his personal
possessions); Farley v. United States, 381 F.2d 357 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
942 (1967) (use of suspect's address); People v. Hernandez, 263 Cal. App. 2d 242, 253-
54, 69 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454-55 (1968) (use of suspect's birthdate); People v. Walters, 252
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ing evidence raises a difficult question: must the information obtained
from the suspect during booking be excluded from evidence at a subse-
quent trial if the suspect was not warned before booking of his constitu-
tional rights to remain silent and to have counsel present?5  In other
words, are the procedural requirements of Miranda v. Arizona6 applica-
ble to the booking process?
Cal. App. 2d 336, 338-39, 60 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376 (1967) (use of suspect's place of
employment and wife's address); State v. Rasmussen, 92 Idaho 731, 735-36, 449 P.2d
837, 841-42 (1969) (use of suspect's statement as to occupation); Clarke v. State, 3 Md.
App. 447, 450-52, 240 A.2d 291, 293-94 (1968) (use of suspect's statement as to his
place of employment in order to find stolen goods); State v. Jordan, 506 S.W.2d 74, 82-
83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (use of suspect's social security number as incriminating
evidence).
5. "No person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
difficulty of determining on a case-by-case basis whether incriminating statements
elicited from an individual who is in police custody are the product of that individual's
exercise of free will. Id. at 445-48. Accordingly, the Court established procedural rules
designed to protect the suspect from the compelling influences inherent in custodial
interrogation. Id. at 444. The police must warn a suspect in custody that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used as evidence against him, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one
will be provided for him. Id. The suspect must waive these rights before any
interrogation can take place. Id. at 444-45. Unless these procedures are complied with,
any admissions resulting from custodial interrogation are presumed to be the product of
coercion and are therefore inadmissible. Id. at 444, 498-99.
Recent cases have cast doubt on the continued vitality of the Miranda doctrine and
the exclusionary rule, the means by which its strictures are enforced. In Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Supreme Court held that statements elicited from a
defendant in violation of Miranda could be used for impeachment purposes. In
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), where the custodial interrogation occurred
before the Miranda decision, but was nonetheless subject to the Miranda rules because
the defendant's trial was delayed until after Miranda, the Court refused to apply the
Miranda exclusionary rule, noting that there had been no willful misconduct by the
police. Cf. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (Court refused to give
retroactive effect to a relatively new search and seizure rule which would have deprived
the government of evidence in a case where there had been no intentional governmental
misconduct); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (holding that admissibility of
inculpatory statements, made while suspect is in custody and after he has elected to
remain silent, depends on whether police "scrupulously honor" his right to cut off
questioning at any time). The analyses in Tucker, Peltier, and Mosley differ markedly
from the analysis in Miranda, which focused not only on the presence of intentional
police misconduct, but also on subjective impressions of the defendant. See Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468-69.
Even if the Miranda rules are replaced by a less stringent scheme of procedural
safeguards, the status of booking in relation to other stages of the criminal investigation
process will remain an important question. Regardless of what procedures are substitut-
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Although booking occurs after a suspect has been taken into
custody, there has been disagreement among the federal circuits on
whether Miranda should apply to this early stage of the criminal process.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that
an admission obtained during booking must be excluded from evidence
unless the Miranda procedures are strictly followed, 7 while the Courts of
Appeals for the Second,8 Fifth,9 Eighth,10 and Ninth1 Circuits have
held Miranda to be inapplicable to booking.12 The purpose of this Note
ed for those mandated by Miranda, it wil be necessary to determine their applicability in
the borderline custodial context of booking.
7. Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (suspect's answer to
arresting officer's question whether he was employed held not admissible since warnings
had not been given before questioning). See notes 20-24 infra and accompanying text.
8. United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976) (suspect's answers about marital status and number of
children held admissible although warnings were not given before booking). See notes
34-43 Infra and accompanying text.
9. Farley v. United States, 381 F.2d 942 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 942
(1967) (suspect's answer as to where he lived held admissible even though he had
previously indicated that he did not want to be questioned). See notes 13-19 infra and
accompanying text.
10. Morrison v. United States, 491 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1974) (suspect's criminal
record held admissible although the information was obtained from him after he had
refused to waive his Miranda rights). See notes 29-33 infra and accompanying text.
11. United States v. La Monica, 472 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1972) (admission obtained
during inventory of suspect's personal possessions held admissible even though suspect
had refused to discuss his case in the absence of his attorney). See notes 25-28 infra
and accompanying text.
12. While the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
have all been willing to make exceptions to Miranda for booking information in
particular cases, their positions on the general issue of the applicability of Miranda to all
booking information may not be identical. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Farley v. United States, 381 F.2d 357 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
942 (1967), was apparently restricted to the facts of that case, and it is uncertain
whether the circuit will adopt a general rule applicable to all booking situations. See
United States v. Martinez, 512 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1975) (court declined to decide
whether arrested subject must be given Miranda warnings before being asked to state his
nationality); United States v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935, 939-41 (5th Cir. 1974) (dicta:
better view among conflicting authorities is that Miranda is inapplicable to booking).
The Eighth Circuit's analysis in Morrison v. United States, 491 F.2d 344 (8th Cir.
1974), would be applicable to any case where the identifying information obtained is a
matter of public record (such as a name, address, or criminal record), but in a case
involving a matter which cannot be found in public records (such as an alias) the court
might well hold that Miranda is applicable. The Ninth Circuit's decision, United States
v. La Monica, 472 F.2d 580, 591 (9th Cir. 1972), is worded only in terms of the facts of
that particular case, but since the facts emphasized (no investigative purpose, no
persistent or coercive interrogation, and no guile or trickery) would probably apply to
most other booking cases, the case could be viewed as expressing a broad rule exempting
the booking process from Miranda. Only in United States ex reL Hines v. LaVallee, 521
F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976), is it clear that a general
rule exempting booking from the scope of Miranda is being adopted.
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is to examine the reasoning used by these courts in reaching their
respective conclusions and to study the ramifications of their positions.
It will be shown that a strict application of Miranda to all booking
questions would completely frustrate the maintenance of necessary po-
lice administrative records. It would be constitutionally impermissible,
however, to exempt from the Miranda safeguards all questioning which
might come under the booking rubric. Therefore, a compromise rule
will be suggested, which will allow the compilation of vital police
records without interfering with the suspect's privilege against self-
incrimination.
JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EXCLUSION OF INCRIMINATORY
STATEMENTS MADE DURING THE. BOOKING PROCESS
The first federal appellate court to decide a case involving the
applicability of Miranda to routine booking questions was the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Farley v. United States.'3 Farley was
arrested after being found near the scene of an attempted burglary at
2:30 a.m. During a subsequent interview with a law enforcement
officer, Farley refused to discuss his case and referred the officer to his
attorney who was not then present. After this refusal to talk, the officer
asked, "Will you tell me where you live?", and Farley stated his ad-
dress. 4 At trial the prosecution used the address to show that Farley
lived a considerable distance from the scene of the crime and had no
good reason to be there at 2:30 a.m. 5 Farley was convicted and
appealed, urging that his address had been obtained in violation of
Miranda and was therefore inadmissible at trial.
The court of appeals pointed out that where Farley lived was a
matter of public knowledge, and that the authorities no doubt would
have obtained his address very quickly by independent investigation if
he had refused to give it to them.' 6 It also noted that the address had
very little probative value with regard to Farley's guilt or innocence.' 7
Furthermore, there was no evidence that the officer had in any way
13. 381 F.2d 357 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 942 (1967).
14. Id. at 358-59. It is not clear that the officer who asked Farley where he lived
was doing so for booking purposes. He may have been trying to obtain an investigative
lead or perhaps merely to start a conversation. In any case, the question is one which is
regularly asked during booking, see note 2 supra, and the Farley court's analysis is
applicable to the Miranda-booking issue.
15. 381 F.2d at 358.




attempted to compel the defendant to answer the question. 8 Under
such circumstances, the court found that it would not be "reasonable to
apply Miranda so strictly as to exclude the response to that inquiry."' 9
A year later, in Proctor v. United States,20 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that Miranda should be strictly
applied to booking. Proctor, who was charged with robbery, testified at
trial that he had been at work at the time of the robbery. In order to
disprove Proctor's alibi defense, the prosecution called on the officer
who had booked Proctor, and he testified that Proctor had told him that
he had been unemployed at the time of the robbery.2' Proctor appealed
from his conviction on the ground that his statement to the booking
officer was inadmissible.22
The Proctor court did not mention Farley, nor did it make refer-
ence to the Farley criterion of whether the information obtained was a
matter of public knowledge. Rather, the court identified the presence
of coercion in the booking process as the critical factor. The booking
officer's intent was found to be irrelevant. Even if no coercion had
been intended, the suspect's answer could not be accepted as voluntary
because of the inherent coerciveness of the situation.23  The case was
remanded for determination of whether the suspect had executed a valid
waiver of his Miranda rights before responding to the booking ques-
tions.24
In United States v. La Monica,25 the Ninth Circuit joined the Fifth
Circuit by admitting into evidence a statement elicited during routine
post-arrest police procedures. After La Monica was arrested for trans-
porting marijuana into the United States, he was informed of his Miranda
rights and stated that he did not want to discuss his case. While
compiling an inventory of La Monica's personal effects, however, a
customs agent came across a receipt for attorney's fees and asked him
what it was. La Monica replied that he had paid an attorney five
18. Id. Apparently, the court was referring here to overt acts of compulsion rather
than to any compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation.
19. Id.
20. 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
21. Id. at 820.
22. Proctor was decided before Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), where the
Supreme Court held that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda's procedural rules
is admissible for the purpose of impeaching a defendant's testimony. Under Harris, the
statement made to the booking officer would clearly be admissible, if used merely to
impeach Proctor and not as substantive proof of his guilt.
23. 404 F.2d at 820-21.
24. Id. at 822.
25. 472 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1972).
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hundred dollars before going to Mexico, "just in case anything went
wrong on the trip."2 Without reference to either of the two previous
cases in which the isgue had been considered, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
La Monica's conviction on the basis of the agent's non-investigative
intent in asking about the receipt, a factor which had been found
irrelevant in Proctor.17  The court focused on the fact that the agent
had not been trying to elicit incriminating information, but merely
attempting to identify the defendant's personal possessions."
In Morrison v. United States,29 the defendant was arrested for
passing counterfeit money. He was informed of his rights and refused
to talk about the incident leading to his arrest. During "processing" by
Secret Service agents, however, he did give general background informa-
tion, including his prior criminal record and the fact that he was
"presently on parole from a federal counterfeit conviction. .... ,,30
This conviction was admitted at trial for the purpose of proving Morri-
son's intent to defraud."1
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit rejected Morrison's claim that the
admission of his prior conviction violated his rights under Miranda.
While the court did not mention Farley, Proctor or La Monica, it relied
on the Farley-type argument32 that Miranda does not protect a de-
fendant from being compelled to disclose matters of public knowl-
edge. The Secret Service agents therefore were not required to obtain a
waiver of rights from Morrison before questioning him about his crimi-
nal record. 3
The most recent, and best reasoned, opinion on the applicability of
Miranda to booking questions is that of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Hines v. LaValee.34 In that
case, a rapist had told his victim that he had been married eleven years
and had two children. Hines was later arrested because he matched the
victim's description of her assailant. Without having given the Miranda
warnings, the arresting officer questioned Hines about his background
and learned that he had been married eleven years and had two chil-
26. Id. at 581.
27. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
28. 472 F.2d at 581.
29. 491 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 345.
31. Id. See note 47 infra.
32. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
33. Id. at 346-47. The court not only found Miranda inapplicable, but also implied
that this information was wholly outside of the fifth amendment's protections. Id. at
347.
34. 521 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976).
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dren.311 After being convicted in state court,36 Hines applied to the
federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the
arresting officer's testimony about the booking information should have
been ruled inadmissible as obtained in violation of his rights under
Miranda. The district court recognized the existence of a conflict
among the circuits and followed Farley, holding the evidence properly
admitted and denying the writ. 17
In affirming the district court's decision, the Second Circuit inter-
preted Miranda as applicable only to "'questioning designed to investi-
gate crimes or the involvement of the arrested person or others in crimes'
as distinguished from 'non-investigative questioning.' "8 Since the
questions asked about Hines' marital status were needed for booking
and were not asked for investigative purposes, the court held them to be
outside the scope of the Miranda safeguards and concluded that the
information obtained had been properly admitted into evidence."
The significance of the case, however, lies not so much in the
relatively straight-forward result as in the court's general discussion of
the uncertain status of identification data under the fifth amendment.
The court first acknowledged the inherent tension between the adminis-
trative need for immediate ascertainment of a suspect's identity and the
possibility that superficially innocuous data "may in a particular context
provide the missing link required to convict."40 It then pointed out that
even if a suspect refused to identify himself, a court could compel him to
furnish physical evidence which would enable the police to determine
his identity, regardless of the potential incriminatory effect of such
evidence." The court found that
[a]lthough data thus obtained may be distinguished from information
as to identity furnished orally on the ground that the latter is testi-
monial in character, the line of demarcation is thin. 42
35. Id. at 1110. This conversation took place enroute to the police station, and the
officer's questions were, in the court's words, "designed to pass the time by seeking
background data." Id. In its discussion of the issues of the case, however, the court
treated the defendant's statement as one obtained during booking.
36. People v. Hines, New York Supreme Court, County of the Bronx, Dec. 18, 1972
(unreported), aff'd per curiam, 43 App. Div. 2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1st Dep't
1973).
37. The Second Circuit likewise acknowledged the split of authority while discussing
the unreported district court opinion. 521 F.2d at 1111.
38. Id. at 1113, quoting MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8(5)
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1974).
39. Id. at 1113.
40. Id. at 1112.
41. See notes 56-64 infra and accompanying text.
42. 521 F.2d at 1112.
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The essential question was posed by implication: if an individual can
be compelled, consistent with his constitutional rights, to produce evi-
dence which will lead to the certain discovery of his identity by the
police, and which may ultimately incriminate him, then why can he not
simply be compelled to reveal his identity orally?43
Tim APPLICABILITY OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TO BOOKING
In expanding its discussion beyond the limited issue of the applica-
bility of Miranda to the booking process, the Hines opinion raises the
more fundamental question of whether a suspect being booked enjoys
any fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination." From a
theoretical standpoint, neither the police need for administrative infor-
mation nor the practical similarities between compelling nontestimonial
evidence of identity and requiring an oral statement of identity (the
factors cited by the Hines court) individually warrant forcing a suspect
to incriminate himself during booking. The combined weight of these
two considerations, however, may justify the view that some minimal
identifying information is not within the scope of the fifth amendment
privilege.
The Need for Administrative Information
If the information requested during booking were used primarily to
aid the police in their investigation of crime, then booking would be
indistinguishable from other forms of custodial interrogation, and any
exception to either Miranda or the fifth amendment would be unjustifia-
43. See text accompanying note 65 infra. The Hines court held alternatively that
even if the booking information was not admissible under Miranda, its admission would
have been harmless error because of the overwhelming independent evidence of Hines'
guilt. 521 F.2d at 1113. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). While the harmless error doctrine was applicable in
the particular fact situation in Hines, it cannot, standing alone, justify the Hines holding
that Miranda is inapplicable to booking. There is no guarantee that in every case where
an individual's response to a booking question is admitted at trial over his objection the
admission will be harmless. If the Hines rule is to be extended to all cases involving a
response to a booking question, the rule must be one which can stand on its own merits
no matter how harmful the admitted statement is to the defendant's case. If, on the
other hand, the Hines "rule" is usable only in cases where the harmless error doctrine
itself could be relied upon, then it is superfluous.
44. Even if Miranda were not applicable to booking, self-incrimination problems
could still arise if the fifth amendment privilege were applicable. A well-informed
individual might refuse to answer a particular booking question on the ground that his
answer would be incriminatory.
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ble.45  However, this information is needed for administrative purposes
which normally have nothing to do with proving the individual's guilt or
innocence. The police officers who have arrested a suspect need to
know if he is wanted elsewhere so that other police agencies searching
for the same person can be notified.46  The individual's identity will also
be needed to obtain a record of any previous arrests and convictions.
This record may, of course, have some evidentiary value, 47 but it also
may be needed to decide upon security 8 or health49 measures during the
suspect's incarceration, and will certainly be needed when he is brought
before a magistrate to fix bail.' 0 Finally, the booking process serves as
a check on the police since it requires the maintenance of a record of
those arrested and the charges against them.5' This record may be
helpful in preventing such abuses of the arrest power as the harassment
of particular individuals or groups." - Thus, there are important admin-
45. Of course, an individual could be compelled to provide incriminating booking
information if he were granted "use immunity," thus preventing the government from
using the information as evidence or as a lead to evidence against the individual. See
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964). Such a restriction would be unacceptable to the police in most
cases, however, since it is virtually impossible to investigate a crime without using data
about the suspect's identity and background in some manner.
46. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JuSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 57 (1967). See also A MASTER PLAN FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR THE STATE OF North CAROLINA (prepared
for the Governor's Committee on Law and Order) 3-3.
47. A record of prior convictions may be used as evidence for "proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." FED. R. Ev. 404(b); see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed. 1972). See note 31 supra. It may also be used to impeach the
defendant if he testifies. See id. § 43; FED. R. Ev. § 609(a).
48. An individual who had a previous record of escapes or of violence might be
jailed in a maximum security cell or unit, and separated from other, less dangerous
prisoners. See A MASTER PLAN FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR THE
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 46, at 3-3, 3-9.
49. See id. Special health measures might be required if the suspect had a history of
drug dependence, mental disturbances, or some physical weakness such as a heart
condition.
50. See, e.g., United States ex rel Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1970) (previous
convictions included in a list of factors to be considered in setting bail).
51. See State v. Smith, 295 Minn. 65, 69, 203 N.W.2d 348, 351 (1972); State v. Jor-
dan, 506 S.W.2d 74, 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); PROJECr ON LAw ENFORCEMENT POLICY
AND RULEMAKING, MODEL RULES, RELEASE OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS Rule
101 (approved draft 1974) (published by the College of Law of Arizona State University
and the Police Foundation).
52. "'Booking' is an administrative record of an arrest . . . . This official and
permanent arrest record 'provides a valuable protection against secret arrests and
improper police tactics.'" Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 605-06
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istrative benefits to be derived from booking which are completely
divorced from any tendency of that process to elicit incriminating evi-
dence from a suspect.
While the Hines court relied in part on the administrative value of
booking to justify exempting the process from Miranda procedures, 3 it
failed to consider how much data is really necessary to meet the admin-
istrative need for an arrested person's identity. Although all of the
information requested during booking may be desirable from the police
viewpoint,54 it is not all needed for administrative (as opposed to
investigative) reasons. There is no administrative reason, for example,
why a suspect should have to give explanations about the items in his
possession at the time of his arrest, or disclose his marital status, the
number of his children, his place of employment, or his prior criminal
record.55  Thus, while the need for administrative information lends
support to the argument that an arrested suspect should be required to
give the police some identifying data, it does not.justify requiring him to
answer a broad range of booking questions, some of which serve no
administrative purpose and could only be intended to establish leads for
police investigation. The arrested suspect should be sufficiently "identi-
fied" for administrative purposes when he has disclosed his name and
address.
Comparison of Identification Data to Nontestimonial Evidence
The fifth amendment prohibition applies only to the compulsion of
testimonial evidence.58 In distinguishing between testimonial and non-
testimonial evidence the courts have generally relied upon a communica-
tive test, asking whether the evidence consists of or was produced by a
communication of the defendant's thoughts.17  Thus, a written or verbal
(1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari), quoting, LA. CODE
CRim. PRo. ANN. art. 228, Official Revision Comment (a) (West 1967). See also W.
LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 379-82.
53. 521 F.2d at 1112; see note 39 supra and accompanying text.
54. In F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 13-14 (2d
ed. 1967), for example, it is suggested that before an interrogator meets with a suspect,
he should familiarize himself with all of the facts of the case and with the suspect's
personal background. This study would no doubt include an examination of the arrest
report. See also A MASTER PLAN FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR
THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 46, at 3-3, which suggests that information
on the suspect's background may provide investigative leads.
55. Each of these items of information may have an incriminatory effect. See note 4
supra and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
57. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 6, 7 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388
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statement would be testimonial evidence, but a handwriting or voice
exemplar examined solely for its physical characteristics and not for any
communicative content would be nontestimonial,58 and therefore outside
the protection of the fifth amendment privilege, even if it were clearly
incriminating. Under this communicative test, it has been held that a
defendant may be compelled to furnish fingerprints59 or blood sam-
ples,60 to participate in a line-up6' or submit to photographing,62 and
to provide handwriting"' and voice exemplars, 4 since all of these pro-
cedures produce only nontestimonial evidence.
U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). Perhaps
the best statement of the communicative test is that made by Justice Holmes in Holt v.
United States:
[Tihe prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence
when it may be material. 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
58. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); ABA PRojEcr ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDs RELATING TO DIscovERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE
TRIAL § 3.1(a) (1970); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 160.2(3),
160.2(6) (1975).
59. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223 (1967); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966); Snow v. Oklahoma, 489 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1973); Ward v.
United States, 486 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974); United
States v. Sanders, 477 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870 (1973); United
States v. Cary, 470 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Hackworth v. Beto, 434 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1970); Cornell v. Maryland, 396 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975); Bonaparte v. Smith,
362 F. Supp. 1315, 1318-19 (S.D. Ga.), a/I'd, 484 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 981 (1974).
60. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966); Ferguson v. Cardwell,
392 F. Supp. 750 (D. Ariz. 1975).
61. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1967); United States v.
Jackson, 509 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Pierce v. Cannon, 508
F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); United States v. Wilcox, 507
F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 979 (1975); Reynolds v. Lockhart, 470
F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1972).
62. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); United States v.
Jewett, 520 F.2d 581 (1st Cir. 1975); Nassar v. Vinzant, 519 F.2d 798 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 202 (1975); United States v. Hurt, 476 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 932-33 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S.
922 (1967).
63. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Snider, 499 F.2d
424 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1115 (1975); United States v. Lincoln, 494
F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hopkins, 486 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Osborne, 482 F.2d 1354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Brown, 398 F.
Supp. 444 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
64. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Baller, 519
F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. Franks, 511
F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United States v. Bozeman, 495
F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975); United States v. Ryan,
478 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1973).
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As noted above, the Hines opinion raises a troublesome question
about the validity of this traditional communicative test for distinguish-
ing between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence: if an individual
may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, participate in a line-up,
or provide handwriting and voice exemplars, where is the logic in allow-
ing him to refuse to state his identity?6 5
Although the courts have usually relied on the communicative
test,66 there is a limited Supreme Court precedent for departure from it
which suggests a solution to the dilemma posed in Hines. In California
v. Byers, 7 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a California statute
which required the driver of any motor vehicle involved in an accident
to stop and give his name and address.6" Byers, who was prosecuted
for failure to comply with the statute, contended that giving his name
and address would tend to incriminate him and that the statute was
therefore inconsistent with the fifth amendment. Rejecting Byers'
claim, a plurality of the Court found that the California statute was
enacted for a valid regulatory purpose,69 and that compliance with the
law posed no untoward risk of self-incrimination, 70 rendering the report-
ing requirement not "incriminating in the traditional sense."'71 The
65. See 521 F.2d at 1112; notes 34-44 supra and accompanying text.
66. See cases cited in note 57 supra.
67. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
68. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 20002(a)(1) (West 1971).
69. 402 U.S. at 430. The plurality opinion was concurred in by four of the Justices.
Justice Harlan, concurring only in the result, maintained that Byers' name and address
were both incriminating and testimonial evidence, but found that Byers could be
compelled to disclose them anyway, under a balancing approach which took into account
the governmental need for the information, the nature of the information, and the fact
that there was no other way to obtain it. Id. at 434 et seq.
70. Id. at 431.
71. Id. Another rationale advanced for the decision in Byers was that the appel-
lant's name and address were not incriminating. At least one federal court of appeals,
relying on Byers, has concluded that "[t]he identification of oneself is not self-
incriminating and thus not protected by the Fifth Amendment." United States v. Leal,
460 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); cf. United States v.
Leyba, 504 F.2d 441, 443 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975). This
broad conclusion is not warranted; whether an item of evidence is incriminating depends
entirely on the circumstances of the particular case. A holding that a name and address
are not inculpatory in civil cases would not necessarily mean that they are not
incriminating in criminal cases, and a holding that they are not incriminating in one
criminal case would not necessarily mean that they are not in another criminal case:
The government argues that in no case can it be incriminating to ask a per-
son his name. This seems dubious. "Are you John Wilkes Booth?" might well
have been a dangerous question if a policeman had been there to ask it when
the notorious assassin of President Lincoln stumbled into Dr. Mudd's office for
treatment of his injured leg. United States v. Bey, 385 F. Supp. 227, 229
(W.D. Pa. 1974), vacated and remanded, 517 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975).
When the divulgence of a name injures the suspect only in the sense that it identifies
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plurality went on to uphold the statute on an alternative ground which
opened the door to a simple if somewhat arbitrary resolution of the
Hines dilemma-that disclosure of a name and address was not "testi-
monial" in nature, and hence not protected by the fifth amendment.72
In reaching its decision in Byers, the plurality made repeated
reference to the automobile accident context in which the California
statute was to be applied; 7 at the outset, Chief Justice Burger noted that
the case presented a "narrow" question.74 Nonetheless, several lower
federal courts have relied on Byers for the proposition that an individual
may always be compelled to divulge his name and address.75
him as a person whom the police have been seeking in connection with a crime, then it
should not be constitutionally protected even though it is, in a sense, incriminating.
Assume, for example, that a man named James Moriarty is wanted by the police for
robbery, and that they find and arrest him through the use of a detailed description. If
the suspect refuses to identify himself because that would prove beyond any doubt that
he is the person who was being sought, then it would seem, intuitively, that he should not
be entitled to invoke the fifth amendment's protection: the name James Moriarty does
not prove or disprove his guilt in the crime for which he was wanted, but merely makes
it possible to initiate prosecution and prove his guilt through other evidence.
Cases can arise, however, where a suspect's name would be an item of substantive
evidence tending to prove his guilt. For example, in United States v. Bey, 385 F. Supp.
227 (W.D. Pa. 1974), vacated and remanded, 517 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975), government
agents were informed that a gun had been shipped from Denver to one Tarik All Bey in
Pittsburgh. The agents went to the defendant's home, and without giving the Miranda
warnings, asked him if he was Tarik Ali Bey. He said he was, and the agents then asked
him if he had been previously convicted of a felony under the name of Warren Williams.
(Neither name was an alias. Williams was his "legitimate family name," 385 F. Supp. at
228 n.1, and Bey was his chosen Muslim name.) Bey answered affirmatively, and he was
then charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1970), which makes it a crime for any
person who has been convicted of a felony "to receive any firearm . . . which has been
shipped oritransported in interstate . . . commerce." The district court suppressed Bey's
statements because the agents had failed "to give the appropriate warnings until after the
evidence had been extracted." 385 F. Supp. at 229. The court, citing Byers, recognized
that a name might not be "testimonial," id. at 229 & n.4, but felt that "the agents had
extracted from the defendant's own mouth evidence completely establishing his
guilt. . . ." Id. at 229.
Thus, Bey shows that while a name may be nontestimonial, see text accompanying
note 72 infra, it clearly may be incriminatory in certain situations. An address can also
be incriminating evidence. See, e.g., Farley v. United States, 381 F.2d 357 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 942 (1967). Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Byers that
Byers' name and address were not incriminating should be limited to the particular facts
involved in the case, and should not be considered controlling in criminal cases involving
an entirely different set of facts.
72. 402 U.S. at 431-34.
73. See id. at 430-31, 433-34.
74. Id. at 425.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Camacho, 506 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Leyba, 504 F.2d 441, 443 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975);
United States v. Leal, 460 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). But
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The Scope of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination During Booking
The import of the preceding discussion for the booking process is
that the police should be able to require any arrested suspect to state his
name and address. Insofar as these items of information are nontesti-
monial, they are not protected by the fifth amendment, even if clearly
incriminating.7" If compelling a suspect to reveal his name and address
does not offend the privilege against self-incrimination, then it cannot be
held violative of the more limited Miranda safeguards.y7
There is no basis, however, for suggesting that any additional
identifying information elicited during booking is exempt from the privi-
lege against self-incrimination: communicative disclosures other than
a suspect's name and address are clearly testimonial. 78  More important-
see United States v. Bey, 385 F. Supp. 227, 229 (W.D. Pa. 1974), vacated and remanded,
517 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975).
In Byers, the Court acknowledged that it was balancing (1) the individual's
privilege against self-incrimination and (2) the State's need for information to implement
a regulatory, non-criminal scheme. 402 U.S. at 427. See also United States v. San Juan,
405 F. Supp. 686, 694-95 (D. Vt. 1975) (holding constitutional the reporting require-
ments of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1101(a), (b) (1970)). It seems
questionable, therefore, to extend the holding in Byers to situations where the govern-
mental need for information is as closely related to the enforcement of criminal laws as
it is in booking. There are two considerations, however, which seem to justify such an
extension. First, even though a suspect's name and address may be used as evidence
against him, the primary reason for obtaining such data after arrest is to help the police
and judicial officers make certain administrative decisions, which could not be made
without that information. Second, the classification of an item of evidence as nontesti-
monial (unlike its classification as non-incriminating, see note 71 supra) should not
change from case to case. It is hard o imagine a case where a blood sample, or the
physical characteristics of a voice, for example, could be testimonial evidence. Such
items are never testimonial. Admittedly, an oral statement of one's name and address
does not exactly match the other items of evidence which have been held
nontestimonial-it is the only one which does not fit the communicative test. Nonethe-
less, it would seem illogical to say that a person's name and address are nontestimonial in
one case and testimonial in another: the classification as nontestimonial should remain
the same across the board. For these reasons, the Byers holding that a name and
address are nontestimonial should be applicable not only to civil hit-and-run statutes such
as the one involved in Byers, but also to criminal booking cases.
76. See, e.g., Farley v. United States, 381 F.2d 357 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
942 (1967); People v. Walters, 252 Cal. App. 2d 336, 60 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1967).
77. The purpose of the procedural rules of Miranda is to protect the privilege against
self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442-44 (1966). There would be
no point, therefore, in extending the coverage of those rules beyond the scope of the
privilege.
78. Indeed, in California v. Byers, the Supreme Court hinted that Byers could not
constitutionally have been compelled to provide any information other than his name and
address:
We are not called on to decide, but if the dictum of the Sullivan opinion were
followed, the driver having stopped and identified himself, pursuant to the stat-
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ly, there is no need for such additional information except as evidence or
leads to evidence showing the suspect's guilt.7a The fifth amendment
privilege is intended to force the government to produce evidence
against an individual "by its own independent labors, rather than by the
cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth."80 Once
the police have a suspect's name and address, they should be able to find
any other desired identifying data through their own investigation,," and
the suspect should not be compelled to help them do it.8"
THE APPLICABILITY OF Miranda TO BOOKING
The fact that a suspect has the right not to be compelled to disclose
incriminating testimonial identification data does not necessarily mean
that the booking procedures designed to obtain such data should be
governed by the detailed prescriptions of Miranda. In attempting to
show that the Miranda rules are not necessary during booking, the
Farley, La Monica, Morrison, and Hines courts identified two major
distinctions between questioning which accompanies booking and most
other forms of custodial interrogation.
The Lack of Investigative Intent
An officer who is booking a suspect does not ordinarily do so with
the intent of gathering incriminating evidence. This factor was heavily
relied upon in La Monica and Hines,83 while the Proctor court found it
ute, could decline to make any further statement, 402 U.S. 424, 434 n.6
(1971).
But cf. United States v. Leyba, 504 F.2d 441, 443 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 934 (1975), where the court, citing Byers, held that a suspect's response to an FBI
agent's questions asking him his height and weight "was not communicative in nature,"
because it "merely acknowledged the existence of physical characteristics" which were
plainly observable.
79. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text; cf. State v. Smith, 295 Minn. 65,
69, 203 N.W.2d 348, 351 (1972). Even if the Byers approach-balancing the govern-
ment's regulatory needs against the individual's privilege against self-incrimination--can
be applied in a criminal context, it is clear that self-incriminating information should not
be compelled from an individual when there is no legitimate regulatory need for the
information. See text accompanying notes 69-75 supra.
80. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
81. If the suspect has been previously arrested, the police could obtain the necessary
information by simply looking in their own files. If, on the other hand, the suspect has
no previous arrests, the data could be obtained from other public records (for example,
from the Department of Motor Vehicles), by questioning his family and neighbors, or
perhaps by searching his personal possessions. See note 101 infra.
82. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
327-28 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-61 (1966); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442-43 (1966).
83. See also People v. Hernandez, 263 Cal. App. 2d 242, 253-54, 69 Cal. Rptr. 448,
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irrelevant. The majority position was most convincingly stated in
Hines, where the Second Circuit concluded that the only interrogation
condemned in Miranda was investigative interrogation. 84 No distinc-
tion was drawn in Miranda itself between investigative and noninvesti-
gative interrogation. s  The Hines court, however, reasoned that since
the Miranda rules are intended to prevent police abuses in the form of
third-degree interrogation tactics, 6 and such abuses are only likely to
occur when an officer is seeking incriminating evidence, there is no need
for the Miranda safeguards when the purpose of the questioning is only
to obtain administrative information.
This syllogism is valid, but it is based upon the false premise that
the sole purpose of the Miranda warnings is to prevent police abuses.s7
Another equally important purpose of the Miranda rules is to place the
arrested individual on an equal footing with his interrogators by making
him "acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary
system," and by insuring that he is aware of the nature and extent of his
constitutional rights throughout this adversary proceeding. s8 Thus, as
454-55 (1968); People v. Waiters, 252 Cal. App. 2d 336, 338-39, 60 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376
(1967); State v. Rassmussen, 92 Idaho 731, 736, 449 P.2d 837, 842 (1968); Clarke v.
State, 3 Md. App. 447, 450-51, 240 A.2d 291, 293-94 (1968); State v. Jordan, 506
S.W.2d 74, 83 (Mo. App. 1974).
84. 521 F.2d at 1112-13.
85. The Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444 (1966). Professor Kamisar, in discussing the problem of incriminating
statements made during booking, has argued that "absent special circumstances" booking
questions do not generate the same amount of pressure on the suspect which investigative
questioning generates, and "therefore unresponsive incriminating statements made in
reply to such questions" should be admissible, even if the Miranda warnings have not
been given. See Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda, in
CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTrrUTON-SouRcES AND COMMENTARIES 335, 360 (J.
Israel & Y. Kamisar eds. 1968) (emphasis added). The question of whether responsive
incriminating statements made in reply to booking questions should be admissible is left
open. Using Kamisar's "pressure" analysis, it seems that the fact that the booking
information requested is itself incriminating would cause a suspect to feel just as much
pressure as he would in an ordinary investigative interrogation. Morrison, for example,
must have felt a great deal of pressure when the police, after arresting him for passing
counterfeit money, required him to admit that he was on probation from a conviction for
that same crime.
86. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455-57 (1966); United States v. Stamp,
458 F.2d 759, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 975 (1972).
87. This conclusion is drawn from the language of Miranda itself. Language in sev-
eral recent Supreme Court cases suggests, however, that this "false premise" may become
the controlling view in the near future. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975);
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
See note 6 supra.
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966). If incriminating information
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
the Proctor court stated, Miranda would be violated if a suspect were
under an impression that he must divulge incriminating information,
even though no compulsion was intended by the booking officer.89
In most police investigation situations, the two purposes of Miran-
da coincide-the warnings will be necessary both to prevent police
abuses and to insure that the suspect is aware of his rights. In the book-
ing cases, however, only one of the dangers to which Miranda was di-
rected will generally be present, leading to divergent results depending on
which danger a court chooses to emphasize. There is little likelihood of
any police abuses taking place during booking, but there is a strong
possibility that a suspect may answer an incriminating booking question
because he believes that he has no right to refuse to do so. The
conflicting views of the applicability of Miranda to booking can be
explained by the fact that the Farley,"0 La Monica, and Hines courts
place primary emphasis on the policy of preventing police abuses, while
the Proctor court implicitly emphasized the policy of insuring that the
suspect is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to whether or
not he desires to cooperate with the police.
The courts have encountered a parallel problem in determining
whether or not an individual who has not been arrested is in "cus-
tody""' and therefore entitled to the Miranda warnings.9 2  When an
officer questions an individual before there has been a formal arrest, the
officer may have no intention of depriving the individual of his freedom
of action, and yet if the individual believes that the officer plans to hold
him in custody he will feel the same compulsion that an arrested individ-
ual feels. A majority of the courts have rejected the use of subjective
is requested during booking, then the adversary process has already begun. The police
have an interest in learning of the incriminating information, but the best interests of the
suspect require that he withhold it.
89. Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819, 820-21 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
90. In Farley, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not employ the "lack of
investigative intent" argument, but it did rely on the fact that there was no evidence of
any overt acts of compulsion during the questioning. As do the analyses in LaMonica
and Hines, the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Farley fails to recognize that booking, like
custodial investigative interrogation, is inherently coercive.
91. "Custodial interrogation" may take place even if the person interrogated is never
arrested, since the definition given in Miranda includes all "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966) (emphasis added).
92. See 1 PRACTICINO LAw INsTrrUTE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 173-76
(1970); Kamisar, supra note 85, at 360-82; LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the
Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 93-106 (1968);
Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial
Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REv. 699, 706-14 (1974).
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tests which rely on either the officer's intent93 or the suspect's impres-
sions94 to determine whether the particular interrogation was "custodial"
in nature. Instead, they have adopted a compromise objective test:
whether, taking into account the observable actions of the police
officer and the other circumstances of the questioning, a reasonable
person would have concluded that he was deprived of his freedom of
action.95
In order to give some effect to both of Miranda's purposes, courts
should use a parallel objective test in their attempts to determine the
applicability of Miranda to the defendant's booking: whether a reason-
able individual, arrested and booked under the same circumstances as
the defendant, would have believed that he was required to answer the
booking questions even if his answers might incriminate him. If so,
then the defendant should be afforded Miranda protection.9"
Since the circumstances under which a person is booked are fairly
uniform, 97 some general conclusions can be reached under this objective
test. It is readily apparent from the actions of the suspects in cases
discussed in this Note9 that a reasonable person is likely to believe that
he must answer the booking questions.9 9 Apparently, booking is as
93. Smith, supra note 92, at 712; see United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970); Williams v. United States, 381 F.2d 20
(9th Cir. 1967).
94. [A]ny formulation making the need for Miranda warnings depend upon how
each individual being questioned perceived his situation would require a presci-
ence neither the police nor anyone else possesses. United States v. Hall, 421
F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
95. See United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411, 416 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1027 (1974); United States v. Irion, 482 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026 (1973); Iverson v. North Dakota, 480 F.2d 414, 422 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1044 (1973); United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8, 12
(9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 543-45 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970); Freije v. United States, 408 F.2d 100, 103 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969); Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir.
1969); People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 447-49, 426 P.2d 515, 521-22, 58 Cal. Rptr.
115, 121-23 (1967); People v. Parada, - Colo. -, 533 P.2d 1121 (1975).
96. The proposed test follows the Miranda approach, in that it avoids the necessity
of an ad hoe examination of the circumstances surrounding each particular investigation
by providing a rule of general applicability. Compare, for example, the difficulty of
reaching consistent results under the Hines test, which focuses on the investigative intent
of the officer, see notes 34-43 supra and accompanying text, or the Proctor analysis,
which predicates the applicability of Miranda on the subjective impressions of the
suspect, see notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
97. See note 2 supra.
98. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
99. In one empirical study, it was found that, even after having received the
Miranda warnings, sixty-seven percent of the arrested individuals questioned believed
that they had .to answer identification questions put to them by the police. Of the
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inherently coercive a situation as custodial investigative interrogation.
For this reason, in the ordinary case the police should be allowed to ask
a suspect for his name and address before they give the Miranda
warnings; however, before they ask any other booking questions, they
should be required to warn the suspect of his rights, and if the suspect
desires to remain silent or to speak with an attorney, all questioning-
both booking and investigative-should cease.
The Public Knowledge Argument
The thrust of the public knowledge argument advanced in Farley
and Morrison to justify exempting booking from Miranda is that it is
meaningless to worry about whether the suspect felt compelled to give
his address or other identification information to the police since such
information is readily available in a telephone book or some public file.
Even if he had given the information because of some compulsion
inherent in the booking process, these courts have reasoned, the disclo-
sure could not have had any effect on the outcome of the case, because
the police would undoubtedly have obtained the information before trial
anyway. 1 0 The public knowledge argument would apply to any informa-
tion which is readily available through some means other than interroga-
tion, such as the examination of public documents, the search of the
suspect's personal possessions, 1 1 or the use of nontestimonial identifica-
sixty-seven percent, seven percent believed that they were required to identify not only
themselves, but also any physical objects with which they were confronted. Another
seven percent believed that they were required to answer any questions asked of them.
See Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47
DENvER L.J. 1, 16 (1970).
100. See Morrison v. United States, 491 F.2d 344, 346-47 (8th Cir. 1974); Farley v.
United States, 381 F.2d 357, 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 942 (1967). See also
State v. Jordan, 506 S.W.2d 74, 83 (Mo. App. 1974).
The public knowledge argument is logically related to the harmless error rule as
applied in Hines, see note 43 supra. In each instance, the conclusion reached is that the
lack of practical impact outweighs the presence of a technical constitutional error.
101. As part of the booking process, the police seize and inventory the personal
effects of those suspects who will be incarcerated. This "established and routine" part of
the booking process has been held to be consistent with the fourth amendment, United
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 & nn.4-6 (1974), because of the administrative
need to prevent weapons or other contraband from being introduced into the prison,
and the need to protect the suspect's possessions. If incriminating evidence is discovered
by this inventory search, it may be admitted in evidence. Id. at 803 & nn.4-5 (citing
cases).
While it is clear that the police may seize any papers and documents which are in
the suspect's possession when he is arrested, the question of whether such testimonial
items can be used as incriminating evidence against him remains unresolved. When the
Supreme Court held that items which were merely evidentiary in nature (as opposed to
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tion procedures.' 0 2
Although initially appealing, the public knowledge argument has
major weaknesses. First, even if the argument were theoretically sound,
it would not justify a broad exemption of all booking questions from
Miranda. Some of the information requested during booking (such as
a suspect's aliases, occupation, and explanations about his personal
possessions) may not be discoverable from public records or through
ordinary police investigation. Before any such nonpublic data is asked
for, a suspect would have to be warned that he has a right not to answer.
Second, the fact that an item of information is readily available
through independent investigation is really a very persuasive reason to
require the police to obtain it there, rather than from a suspect who has
already indicated that he does not want to be questioned. Such a rule
would not have any harmful effects on the government's case, and
would better implement the philosophy of the fifth amendment, which is
to preserve an adversary system of criminal procedure by preventing the
government from compelling self-incriminatory disclosures so that it
items which were the instrumentalities or fruits of crimes) could be lawfully seized, it
noted that:
The items . . involved in this case are not "testimonial" or "communicative"
in nature, and their introduction therefore did not compel respondent to be-
come a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment ...
This case thus does not require that we consider whether there are items of
evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a
reasonable search and seizure. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302-03
(1967).
The Court has not considered the issue since Hayden, but a majority of the circuit
courts have held that personal papers and documents are admissible as incriminating
evidence against the suspect from whom they were seized, on the ground that the
compulsion involved in a search and seizure is not a compulsion requiring the defendant
to perform a testimonial act. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 175, 177-79 (10th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3756 (June 30, 1976); United States v. Daw-
son, 516 F.2d 796, 806-07 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975); United
States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178, 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 854 (1974);
United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 896-97 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
984 (1971). Contra, Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971). Some writers have suggested that the admissibility of such documentary
evidence should depend on its public or private nature. See, e.g., Comment, Papers,
Privacy and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: A Constitutional Analysis, 69 Nwv. U.L.
REv. 626, 647-48 (1974); Comment, The Search and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth
and Fifth Amendment Considerations, 6 LOYOLA UNIv. L. REv. 274, 300-04 (1973). This
approach also has been adopted in MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 210.3(2) (1975), which would prohibit the use of "personal diaries, letters, or other
writings or recordings, made solely for private use or communication to an individual
occupying a family, personal or other confidential relation, other than a relation in
criminal enterprise ...... Even under this more limited approach, the police can still
obtain a substantial amount of information from such non-private documents as the
suspect's driver's license, draft card, social security card, and credit cards.
102. See notes 56-64 supra and accompanying text.
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might "avoid the burdens of independent investigation."' 03  Applying
the Miranda exclusionary rule to routine identification questions would
deter police officers from using the shortcut of interrogation to obtain
evidence which could be found independently.10 4
CONCLUSION
It has been demonstrated that the arguments for exempting the
entire booking process from the Miranda safeguards are not wholly
persuasive. Most of the information requested during booking is testi-
monial, and much of it is potentially incriminating. Furthermore, it is
apparent that a substantial proportion of all arrested individuals believe
that they are required to answer police identification questions, even if
the solicited information tends to incriminate them. The only way to
give adequate protection to the privilege against self-incrimination is to
insure that the suspect is warned of his right not to answer those
booking questions which call for nonessential, constitutionally-protected
data.
103. Garner v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1178, 1183 (1976); accord, Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
104. [Ihe exclusionary rule, designed to discourage illegal police activity, is use-
less if the police may . . . illegally seize evidence and then claim "we would
have obtained it anyway." Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited
and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 579, 630 (1968).
Some courts have adopted the so-called "inevitable discovery" exception to the fruit of
the poison tree doctrine, which is similar to the public knowledge argument. These
courts would allow the fruit of illegally obtained evidence to be used against a defendant
if it appears that such evidence would have been discovered eventually even without the
use of the original illegally seized evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Nagelberg, 434
F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1970). cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971); Killough v. United States,
336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964); People v. Soto, 55 Misc. 2d 219, 285 N.Y.S.2d 166
(App. Div. 1967), appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d 735, 262 N.E.2d 682, 314 N.Y.S.2d 544
(1970). However, the illegally obtained evidence itself is still inadmissible. See Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (Court held inadmissible certain illegally obtained
lineup identifications, even though the same witnesses could undoubtedly have identified
the defendant in court under proper circumstances).
The "inevitable discovery" rule has been criticized by the courts and commentators
on the same grounds expressed in the text accompanying this note and note 103 supra.
See, e.g., United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1962); Bynum v. United
States, 262 F.2d 465, 467-69 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (court reversed a conviction which had
been based partially on fingerprint evidence because the fingerprints used at trial had
been taken pursuant to an illegal arrest, even though another set of the defendant's fin-
gerprints were available from the FBI. At a second trial, the FBI prints were used, the
defendant was convicted once again, and this time the conviction was affirmed. Bynum v.
United States, 274 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 908 (1964));
People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal. 2d 418, 439 P.2d 321, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1080 (1969) (handwriting exemplar held inadmissible because taken during an
illegal arrest). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (fingerprints taken
pursuant to illegal arrest held inadmissible).
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Some minimal identification information is, however, not only
essential for the maintenance of police arrest records, but also outside
the scope of the fifth amendment privilege. Accordingly, an arresting
officer should be permitted to compel a suspect to reveal his name and
address before the Miranda warnings have been given. The Miranda
exemption, however, should be limited to this data alone. The officer
should not be permitted to ask additional booking questions unless the
Miranda procedures have been followed and the suspect has executed a
valid waiver of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel present.
Such a rule would achieve the most reasonable balance between the
rights of the individual and the legitimate interests of law enforcement
authorities. The suspect's fifth amendment privilege would be left
inviolate, while the authorities could obtain the desired information in
the form of nontestimonial evidence, from public records, or through
independent investigation.
